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Alternatives to the Tort System for
Personal Injuryt
JEFFREY O'CONNELL*
The tort liability system for claims for personal injury is both
cumbersome and fortuitous. As at least a partial solution Profes-
sor O'Connell suggests a statute under which a potential defen-
dant would be given the option of offering within a short time to
pay periodically the claimant's net economic loss. Payment would
also include claimant's reasonable attorney's fees. Claimants
would be obligated to accept such payment in discharge of their
personal injury claims, except for cases of death or intentional
injuries.
But given the difficulties of passing a statute, Professor
O'Connell also proposes that sellers of products or services put in
effect an insurance policy or product warranty binding the seller to
tender within a short period the victim's net economic loss regard-
less of the existence of tort liability in any particular case. The
victim would then be given a further short period to accept such
tender or to claim in tort.
INTRODUCTION
Since the 1930's legal academics have been attacking the tort sys-
tem and trying to replace it with alternate means. Although intui-
tively the tort system makes sense in that a wrongdoer should pay an
innocent victim for his wrongdoing, the problem has been, as epide-
t This Article is based on a transcript of the author's lecture at the Washington
State Medical Society in the Fall of 1985.
* John Allan Love Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.A. 1951,
Dartmouth College; J.D. 1954, Harvard University.
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miologists well know, that accidents happen under very complex cir-
cumstances. They happen in the split second of the agony of an auto-
mobile collision; they happen during the organized chaos of surgery;
they happen when a toaster explodes or when an industrial machine
malfunctions. The interconnection between the machine which mal-
functions and the individual who is hurt is one that is very hard to
disaggregate, to use the jargon of social scientists. Even in an auto-
mobile accident it is often very difficult to disentangle who or what
was at fault. A more complicated product injury, an exploding
toaster for example, requires engineering testimony of the most ar-
cane kind to unravel whether the machine was misused by the
owner, or whether it had a design defect in the myriad of electronic
or other complicated parts in even a relatively simple consumer ma-
chine. Moreover, there must be one expert for the plaintiff and one
for the defendant.' The meter goes on ticking while lawyers and en-
gineers try desperately to understand each other.
A very real problem exists here. Engineers do not understand
much law. Indeed, from my experience, engineers do not understand
much English. I do not mean to be overly harsh, but anybody who
thinks in terms of ergs is in serious trouble. At a minimum, an engi-
neer often has trouble convincing laymen of what he or she is talking
about, and an articulate engineer is very difficult to obtain. Having
spent hours readying engineers to testify before jurors, I know that
trying to get them to say what they mean in terms understandable to
laymen is very expensive work; while I am talking with them, an-
other meter is ticking-my meter. When one moves to medical mal-
practice, the complexity of the event becomes truly awesome. While
machines are complicated, these "machines" that humans walk
around in defy description in their complexity. There are sixteen bil-
lion neurons in the cortex of the human brain. If you sat down to
design a machine of that complexity you would need a structure the
size of the Empire State Building, and Niagara Falls flowing over it
to handle all the friction. Yet humans move around in these ma-
chines of between 100 and 250 pounds for eighty years or so with
relatively little friction and not much breakdown. (It is almost
enough to make one religious.)
The point is that when something does go wrong in health care,
the tasks of trying to find out whether the doctor was at fault, or
whether the procedure was an appropriate procedure, or whether the
presenting complaint of the patient made the result inevitable no
matter how skillful the health care provider, provide awesomely
I. See generally J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT INSUR-
ANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 9-28 (1975).
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complicated questions. 2 If engineers do not understand much Eng-
lish, the same is true of doctors. They go to medical school and many
of them never speak English again. They learn a bastardized form of
Greek which they are very proud of and which they tend to use ex-
clusively. It is only under the most intense pressure that they will
return to the language of their childhood. Facilitating this return is
the job of a lawyer when bringing doctors before a jury.
As a result, finding fault is often an extremely expensive business
in both simple and complex cases. In a tort suit, an additional varia-
ble exists that makes it even more of a nightmare of complexity. The
premise that a tortfeasor was a wrongdoer-an evil person-used to
be correct. Prior to the industrial age, most tortfeasors were evil peo-
ple. Before machines it was very hard to injure another without in-
tent. With machines, however, inadvertent injuries became the norm.
Since one began with the premise that a wrongdoer had wronged an
innocent party, the innocent party was allowed to recover not only
for medical expense and wage loss but for the monetary value of
pain. Note, however, that it is one thing to ascertain with relative
rationality the lost wages of a person and his present and future
medical expenses. Yet it is quite another thing to place a monetary
value on physical agony. What is an aching arm worth? There is no
answer to that; there is no market for aching arms. We cannot find a
market functioning anywhere that tells us what migraine headaches
are worth; what the loss of a leg is worth in indignity and loss of
pleasure. So what do we do? We try these issues in front of juries
with lawyers for plaintiffs using harps and violins and other "scien-
tific" instruments to convey the value of this loss, with juries given
almost unlicensed discretion to squander or stint according to how
sympathetic they feel toward the individual, such that females get
more for pain and suffering than males for the same injury, and
older people get more than younger people. There is no reason be-
hind this because nothing has evidenced that females suffer more
than males.3 Once again, trying to rationalize all this in economic
principles is extremely difficult.4
In any serious case, then, two variables of confounding complexity
arise in which vast differences of opinion cause endless litigation and
2. See generally id. at 29-47.
3. Perhaps this is changing; our society has had a protective attitude toward fe-
males generally, and this is one of the few areas where females have benefited from
discrimination.
4. See J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN, 29-34,
62-64 (1979).
negotiation: (I) "What" or "who" was at fault, and (2) What is the
pecuniary value of non-pecuniary loss.
There is also a third variable that tort lawyers have instituted and
kept in the system: the "collateral source rule" which also grew out
of a view of the tortfeasor as an evil person, a wrongdoer. When
individual A injures individual B, and B is already covered by health
insurance to a very substantial degree (or disability insurance, or life
insurance), A is not allowed to take account (nor is the judge or
jury) of the fact that B has already been paid for a good deal of her
economic loss. On the contrary, A must pay all over again. So A
either pays B twice, or there is a very complicated subrogation pro-
ceeding whereby one insurer, the health insurer, who has already
borne the loss, gets involved in a complicated claim to reclaim the
amount already covered by an efficient insurance mechanism. Thus,
the tort liability system is unleashed to bear a cost that society has
already borne, either through private or social insurance, on the
ground that it would be unthinkable to allow the wrongdoer to bene-
fit by the insurance already covering the loss.5
The resulting system, despite its intuitive appeal, is a nightmare.
It is a system where many people are not compensated because they
cannot prove, although in fact it may be the case, that someone or
something was at fault. Many others are paid a small fraction of
their loss because they cannot afford years of delay until the matter
is settled. These are people who are injured; they have mounting
wage loss. So they settle with a tremendous discount to avoid the
delay which a jury trial would entail. Even then, they are usually
paid only years after the event. For example, the average delay in
the case of someone recovering in a product liability claim is about
two years from the event.6 Two years! How long does it take to get a
health insurance claim paid in our country? One month, on the aver-
age.7 And yet for tort claims, seriously injured people must wait two
years in angst and uncertainty as to what they will be paid, when
they will be paid, and if they will be paid. In turn, when they are
paid, because this is a very complicated matter calling for very skill-
ful expertise on the part of counsel, they will be forced to turn over a
third, or a half, or sixty percent, not uncommonly, of what they are
paid in litigation expenses and attorney's fees.
I undertook a study a few years ago, generally confirmed by sub-
5. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1478, 1536-37 (1966).
6. O'Connell, Transferring Injured Victims' Tort Rights to No-Fault Insurers:
New "Sole Remedy" Approaches to Cure Liability Insurance Ills, 1977 U. ILL L.F. 749-
50.
7. See N.Y. INS. DEP'T., AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE ... FOR WHOSE BENEFIT?, A
REPORT TO GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER 19 n.26 (1970).
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sequent studies, 8 in which it was determined that for medical mal-
practice claims, twenty-eight cents out of the medical malpractice
insurance dollar actually went to the victims of malpractice.9 The
rest of it went to insurance overhead and legal fees. Twenty-eight
cents out of every dollar! For products liability, the estimate is about
thirty-seven cents. 10 That is "huge loading"-huge transaction costs
to use the jargon of the economist.
ALTERNATIVES
Workers' Compensation
There is a solution to this. It is surprisingly simple and was discov-
ered about 100 years ago by, of all people, Bismarck. Though Bis-
marck was not exactly the most enlightened figure in the history of
western civilization in the past 100 years, he did figure out a more
humane solution than tort liability. In order to defuse the progressive
movement of the reformists in Germany, Bismarck instituted social
reforms of all kinds, including social insurance reforms. The most
famous reform was workers' compensation,11 a quite simple solution
to the problem of industrial accidents which was raging in Germany,
England, and the United States. The first two great waves of acci-
dents to engulf modern society were railroad accidents and industrial
accidents. Workers' compensation, passed in Germany in the 1880's,
in Britain in the 1890's and in the United States between about 1910
and 1920, decreed that when an employee was injured in the course
of employment he need not sue the employer. He need not allege
that the employer was at fault and that he, the employee, was free
from fault. Rather, if the injury occurred in the course of employ-
ment, the employee would be paid automatically for all medical ex-
penses and for some wage loss. Typically a workers' compensation
wage loss maximum benefit today is in the vicinity of $200 or $300
per week-a social insurance level. That amount is assured to the
victim, regardless of how the accident happened, regardless if he was
at fault, regardless of whether or not he was wearing goggles, re-
8. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON TORT REFORMS, RIGHTING
THE LIABILITY BALANCE 113-17 (1977).
9. O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault
Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501, 506-09 (1976).
10. Id. at 511.
11. For a history of workers' compensation, see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, COMPENDIUM ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 16
(M. Rosenblum ed. 1973).
gardless of whether or not he had used the guard on the machine
properly, regardless of whether or not the employer had maintained
the machine properly for its use. Because the accident occurred in
the course of employment, the loss is payable as an actuarially pre-
dictable and inevitable result of the industrial activity. Nothing is
paid for pain and suffering. Since there is no litigation over fault, the
result is that two litigious issues are eliminated and a healthy, func-
tioning insurance mechanism remains.
Admittedly, there are problems with the workers' compensation
system. It does not work as well as the reformers had expected. It
has, however, worked magnificently compared to the tort system;12
almost anything would. No pressure exists anywhere in the world to
replace workers' compensation with the tort system it replaced. It is
not surprising that reform of workers' compensation is never sug-
gested by anyone in his right mind-except perhaps for a few zany
academics from some place like the University of Chicago. With
such no-fault insurance covering this form of pervasive industrial
risk, no one would think of abandoning the system of workers'
compensation.
No-Fault Insurance
The third great wave of modern accidents arose, of course, from
automobiles. Within the last fifteen years, the no-fault insurance
idea has been applied in some fifteen states to automobile acci-
dents.13 No-fault insurance works as follows: A and B are in an auto-
mobile accident. Under the common law system, A claims against B
based on the fault of B, and B claims against A based on the fault of
A. The prevailing party is compensated, not only for medical expense
and wage loss, but for pain and suffering. No-fault insurance comes
along and says, "Look, A has insurance covering B and B has insur-
ance covering A, under very cumbersome criteria. Why don't we
have a system in which A insures himself for his economic loss-his
medical expense and his wage loss, up to, say, $300 per week. B
insures herself on the same basis. Because each of them is covered
12. According to the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation
Laws:
We have discussed the implications of abolishing workmen's compensation and
reverting to. . .negligence suits, a remedy abandoned some 50 years ago. This
option is still inferior to workmen's compensation . . . . [Tort liability suits
are] a drawn-out, costly, and uncertain process that was dismissed long ago as
a means of dealing with occupational injuries and diseases.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS REPORT 25
(1972).
13. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., COMPENSATING ACCIDENT VICTIMS: A FOLLOW-UP
REPORT ON NO-FAULT AUTO INSURANCE EXPERIENCE (1985). This study indicates that
16 states have no-fault systems and eight more have add-on no-fault programs. But see
Infra note 32 and accompanying text.
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for essential losses, they will be forced to waive their claims based on
fault against each other." Once again, at a stroke, the issues of fault
and of pain and suffering valuation, the two issues litigated so end-
lessly and offensively, are eliminated. Perhaps no-fault insurance has
not worked as well as reformers had expected, but it has worked very
well.1 4
Some Michigan figures indicate the amount of waste in the tort
system that can be eliminated or better used with no-fault insurance
dollars. In Michigan, prior to no-fault, A was forced to carry
$20,000 of tort liability insurance on B and B carried the same on A.
Under no-fault, A insures himself with his own company for unlim-
ited medical expense, including rehabilitation (which very few disa-
bility insurance policies or health insurance policies cover). Thus, A
has bought unlimited medical benefits in case of terribly serious
trauma due to an automobile accident, and possibly millions of com-
pensation dollars before the claim is completed. In addition, no-fault
covers wage loss of $2000 per month for three years, tied to inflation.
Further, one can still sue the other driver under Michigan's no-fault
law if one suffers death or substantial bodily impairment. Michigan
motorists are still required to carry $20,000 of tort liability coverage
under their no-fault law. The no-fault package (unlimited medical
expenses, wage loss of $72,000 dollars payable automatically as long
as the injured party has suffered to that extent, and $20,000 of tort
coverage) costs, the actuaries tell us, about ten percent less than tort
coverage alone would cost. The result is startling: $20,000 of liability
insurance versus no-fault insurance covering unlimited medical and
$72,000 of wage loss. That kind of savings is achievable only when
the lawyers are removed from the system and non-economic loss is
no longer compensated . 5
There are, of course, moral, ethical, and economic questions in-
volved in moving to such a system. A connection exists between the
epidemiological approach to preventing injury, and the insurance
mechanism under no-fault of paying for injury, when, despite the
best efforts of society, an injury occurs."' In both cases the worthy
and the unworthy are lumped together. In both cases those who have
a proclivity to accidents are protected, whether their injuries arose
14. See supra note 12. See also O'Connell & Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice
Between Fault and No-Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REv. 61 (1986).
15. O'Connell, Operation of No-Fault Auto Laws: A Survey of Surveys, 56 NEB.
L. REV. 23, 39-41 (1977). See also U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 13, at 34.
16. O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 299, 321-56 (1963).
through moral failings or not. We neither care nor argue about such
failings. We put seatbelts or airbags in the car which will protect the
drunk and the sober. They will protect the prudent and the impru-
dent. They will protect the skillful and the unskillful. They will pro-
tect those who practice safety and those who do not. They are indis-
criminate. They are a safety net, unconcerned about the merits of
those whom they protect.
Note, then, that no-fault insurance does just the same. It says,
"We are going to protect those injured in accidents by insurance
payments regardless of the moral quality of their act." True, we will
not pay those who intentionally injure themselves. 17 That exception
need not detain us, however, because the number of people who sub-
jectively go out of their way to injure themselves is very small. Note,
though, that under no-fault we protect the drinking driver just as
workers' compensation usually protects the drinking worker. We also
protect the speeding driver; we protect the hot-rodder; we protect all
of those crazy kids (young, or old) who use those crazy machines in
crazy ways, just as the epidemiological approach would try to pre-
vent injury to them regardless of their indiscreet behavior.
This is a moral question worthy of discussion; one cannot dismiss
it. The question I am constantly asked when I testify before state
legislatures is, "Professor, [with a marvelous whining accusation ac-
companying the word] Professor, you gonna pay the drunk driver?"
Yes, I reply, I am going to pay the drunk. I am going to pay him
because he is at risk.18 I also am going to pay him because trying to
distinguish between the drunk and the non-drunk is very difficult.
The more that is at stake, the more evidence can be produced that
he was not drunk; the more likely that he will claim that he just had
the proverbial two beers; that the reason his eyes were bloodshot and
glazed was that he had just been in a collision, not an implausible
claim; that the liquor on his breath is explained by the fact that he
had those two beers. 9 (It is surprising that the brewery business in
the United States survives in light of the fact that no one ever has
more than two beers.) Then, of course, the breathalyzer results will
be attacked very skillfully by a lawyer who will show that the police-
man who administered the test does not have a degree from MIT,
tending to disqualify automatically anybody from testifying on any
scientific matter in any court in the United States.
17. Could any insurance mechanism afford to compensate intentional injuries?
Possibly, but it is hard ethically and it does create actuarial problems to pay people who
by design provoke the insured event.
18. J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT IN-
SURANCE 131-34 (1971).
19. For a description of the fortuities involved in proving drunken driving, see J.
O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 77-82.
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An issue is whether we will spend our resources litigating whether
people were drunk instead of paying people for injuries. Litigating
does not strike me as a terribly profitable way to use the resources of
society. One can argue that it is, and I do not dismiss that argument
as irrelevant. We can carve out exceptions, for example, that we will
not compensate drunk drivers. Once we have done that, however,
why exclude the speeding hot-rodder? Why pay anybody who has
behaved in a suboptimal way? Evidently, making exceptions is hard.
We can carve out the person who intentionally injures himself.20
Most of us would view that exception as a stark bright-line test that
makes sense. Yet once we start decreeing, "let us not pay people who
are very, very careless but do pay people who are very careless,"
lawyers will have a rich time-and stay prosperous as
hell-litigating the difference between "very, very" and "very."
I have spent the last seventeen years of my life trying to extend
this idea of no-fault insurance to all kinds of accidents. I have been
trying to extend this idea to products liability and medical malprac-
tice where the problems exceed those of auto accidents.2 Because
the insured event is much more complicated it takes longer to pre-
pare and to try these cases. Justice Jim Dooley of the Illinois Su-
preme Court used to say that he could take a reasonably articulate
Irish bartender and teach him to try an intersection auto accident
case in about a day and a half. That statement is probably correct.
The brightest lawyer in the world, however, cannot be taught quickly
how to try a medical malpractice case. It is going to be a long, bruis-
ing process; he will have to know enough medicine to cross-examine
a doctor and make him look wrong. It takes a lot of time, effort, and
20. Such a provision could be drafted as follows:
[Benefits are not payable for injury to any person] intentionally causing or at-
tempting to cause injury to himself or to another person for injury arising from
his acts. A person intentionally causes or attempts to cause injury if he acts or
fails to act for the purpose of causing injury or with knowledge that injury is
substantially likely to follow. A person does not intentionally cause or attempt
to cause injury (1) merely because his act or failure to act is intentional or
done with his realization that it creates a grave risk of causing injury, or (2) if
the act or admission causing the injury is for the purpose of averting bodily
harm to himself or to another person.
O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Contributory and Comparative Fault with Compensa-
tory Savings by Also Abolishing the Collateral Source Rule, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 591, 598.
For the necessity of a rigid definition of intentional conduct as opposed to including
conduct such as gross negligence, see J. O'CONNELL, supra note 1, at 154-55.
21. E.g., O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused, Foreclosure of Personal Injury
Claims by Defendant's Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic Losses, 77 Nw. U.
L. REV. 589, 595-96 (1982).
skill. Thus medical malpractice cases, like products cases, are ex-
tremely nasty in terms of the time and effort that goes into them. It
is also much harder to apply the no-fault solution to these cases.
Obviously, if A suffers an auto accident, previous to which he was
in reasonably good shape, and comes out with a terrible gash on his
forehead, or even a leg that has been severed, it is not very hard to
determine that the automobile accident caused his injuries. Now,
however, consider the health care scenario. Assume A goes to a
health care provider and asks the health care provider to treat him.
We cannot decree that the health care provider must automatically
pay for any adverse condition which results after the treatment. Ob-
viously, adverse conditions may be due to the presenting complaint
of A. It may be that no matter what the health care provider did, A
was going to get worse. After all, A was sick when he went to the
health care provider, wasn't he? The result is that distinguishing the
adverse conditions due to the treatment of the health care provider
and/or to the presenting complaint of A, is a most vexing question,
even' on a no-fault basis.22
Merely providing, therefore, that every health care provider will
be liable for all adverse results occurring from medical service is an
unmanageable no-fault criterion. The same is true with product inju-
ries. Should we decree that anybody who produced or sold or pos-
sessed a product will pay for any injuries resulting from that prod-
uct? I go to your house; I slip and fall and I smash my head on your
marble table. Who pays on a no-fault basis for my brain damage, for
my paralyzed condition? Do you pay as a homeowner? Does the
quarry pay for it? Does the person who designed the table pay for
it? Does the retailer pay for it? If so, in what proportions do each of
these pay once you have moved away from a fault criteria? It is hard
enough to identify the person who was at fault and make him pay. If
there was a design defect in the table, then the person who designed
it can be asked to pay. That is relatively easy. But who is going to
pay now under no-fault? Assume I trip over a book and I break my
leg. Does the publisher pay me? He was involved; he was a causal
factor wasn't he? Once fault is not a factor, then why not? Thus, the
whole problem of moving away from the moorings of fault and de-
ciding who pays gets very difficult.2 3
H.R. 3084
There are ways to skirt these problems. I have drafted a statute
which is now before Congress, entitled H.R. 3084,24 which attempts
22. Id. at 596-97.
23. Id.
24. H.R. 3084, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. (1985).
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to address these problems in an uncomplicated way. This proposition
is debatable, as I will be the first to concede; it is being debated
rather ferociously. H.R. 3084 applies only to health care providers,
but it could apply across the board to any tort claim for personal
injury. The bill attempts to avoid the problems of: (1) litigating over
fault, (2) litigating and paying for the value of pain and suffering,
(3) paying even though losses have already been covered, and (4)
being uneasy about who ought to pay on a no-fault basis once you
move beyond workplace accidents or simple automobile accidents.
The bill provides that any defendant of a personal injury claim is
given the option of tendering to a claimant, within approximately
180 days (relatively prompt compared to the tort system), an offer to
pay periodically the net economic loss25 of the claimant beyond any
health or disability insurance already applicable to the injured. Note
that these benefits are lavish compared to most health insurance pol-
icies in effect in this country. "6 If a defendant in a tort suit will
promptly tender those amounts to the claimant, that tender fore-
closes the tort claim. The claimant is forced to accept that amount,
and the "negotiation" is over.
Could I have done better than that? After all, today either party
can settle--or offer to settle-for net economic loss, with no pay-
ment for pain and suffering and no duplication of collateral sources
and no further argument over fault. If parties can agree today to do.
that, why does the bill force the plaintiff to accept the same offer by
the defendant?
Note that the device cannot be reversed. The problem today is
that each side in a personal injury action is often adamant against
such a settlement. Each side has so many variables in its favor that
each believes it can afford to be adamant. The claimant thinks that
he may get much more than his net economic loss-or his lawyer
does. The defendant, on the other hand, thinks that if it can wait
long enough and beat the claimant down it may pay much less than
net economic loss. Perhaps, indeed, it will not have to pay anything.
How can we get around this intransigence on both sides, encouraged
by the very vague and amorphous criteria of liability of which I have
spoken? One cannot eliminate the intransigence on both sides by
25. Net economic loss means any medical expense, including rehabilitation, or
wage loss.
26. As stated earlier, very few health insurance policies cover rehabilitation.
27. For a more extensive discussion of the bill (formerly H.R. 5400, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1984)), see Moore & O'Connell, Foreclosing Medical Claims by Prompt
Tender of Economic Loss, 44 LA. L. REV. 1267 (1984).
passing a no-fault statute requiring both sides to accept disposal of
the cases by the payment of economic loss, for the reason I have
indicated. Nor can one define the insured event very well in advance
for many medical or product injuries. On the other hand, one also
cannot force a defendant to pay any claim made to him by claimant
because if that were the case, any claimant could make a claim
against almost anyone and exact payment. If I were to get hit by a
hit and run driver I could just call up the Registry of Motor Vehi-
cles, get some license plate numbers, and make a claim against the
owners of those numbers, requiring them to pay my economic loss.
Obviously an unworkable scheme would ensue.28 It is not as prob-
lematic, however, to provide that once a defendant has examined a
claim, he will be allowed to force the claimant to accept payment of
net economic losses in total satisfaction of the claim.
A defendant will be inclined to make such payment under certain
circumstances. If, for example, the defendant, after examining the
claim, decides that the claimant never was in the hospital nor was
given the treatment he alleges, then the defendant will not tender net
economic loss because defending and defeating the claim will be
easy. The defendant will defend the claim for moral reasons in an
attempt to evade a reputation of being an easy target for spurious or
marginal claims. On the other hand, assume a claim which, although
the defendant's hospital thinks it might be able to defeat it, is made
by a patient and the adverse result was clearly due to services ren-
dered during his stay. Although the hospital does not believe it was
at fault, since it believes the staff performed impeccably, what will it
cost to pay periodical medical expense and wage loss to this patient
from a corpus that is set aside? Let us assume it turns out to be
$150,000. Now ask what is it going to cost to defend the case? That
may very well turn out to be in the vicinity of $40,000. Next, ask
what will it cost to duplicate the collateral sources of the patient, if
the hospital loses? Assume, as a seriously injured person, he or she
has already received $30,000 from Blue Cross, which in a tort case
the hospital would have to pay all over again either by subrogation
or in duplication of the payment to the patient. Thirdly, what will it
cost the hospital to pay for pain and suffering, if the hospital loses?
Assume that loss would amount to $250,000. Further assume that
the hospital has a fifty percent chance of winning. An exposure of
$140,000 results. 29 Now add to the second two items the defense
costs (which one must pay, win or lose). It is apparent one has
achieved a good trade-180,000 versus $150,000. Indeed, in some
cases what is spent litigating is more than the plaintiff's net eco-
28. See O'Connell, supra note 21, at 604-06.
29. Thirty thousand dollars plus $250,000 divided by two yields $140,000.
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nomic loss.
A virtue of this plan is that it allows the health care provider to
take care of the real needs of the patient without sending a signal to
the other side that its case is weak. Under modern tort law, if a
defendant promptly offers to pay all the net economic loss of a pa-
tient within 180 days, the plaintiff's lawyer will not be inclined to
accept. Rather, he would assume that the defendant thinks that its
case is very weak and that the plaintiff can get many times the ini-
tial offer. But under H.R. 3084, once a defendant comes forward
with such an offer, it need not fear that it will be used as leverage to
exact even more.
What about the claimant? He will be advantaged by this new law.
Most claimants are not happy with the slug-fest lawyers have in-
vented. Anybody who has been seriously injured has no taste for ei-
ther a lottery to determine whether his medical expenses and wage
loss will be paid, or for a bitter fight which serves as a constant re-
minder of the. accident, and which may escalate to the point of the
other side implying, rather snidely, that one should be viewed by a
jury as a liar or a cheat. This amounts to a very unpleasant experi-
ence. It may be fun for lawyers, who engage in the practice fre-
quently, but the people that the lawyers represent-on both
sides-hate it. The seriously injured person is, above all, risk
averse.30 Given the choice between prompt payment of real losses
versus the gamble of long-delayed possible payment of more, the cek-
tainty of payment is most attractive. Under the premise of the bill,
then, spending vast sums to guess at responsibility for the accident,
and to reward some victims much more than their loss and many
others much less, seems not nearly as wise as seeing to it that pa-
tients in general are promptly made whole. It is better to use dollars
to pay for injury victims' losses than to pay lawyers to battle over
whether to pay injury victims' losses. This seems a much better use
of precious insurance funds than funding the litigators.
What are the prospects of the bill? Will it go anywhere? Obvi-
ously trial lawyers are very powerful lobbyists. The personal injury
bar is the most lucrative in the United States. There are many law-
yers making one million dollars a year and better out of personal
injury litigation."' Why? Because unlike most lawyers-who are ad-
30. O'Connell & Beck, Overcoming Legal Barriers to the Transfer of Third-Party
Claims as Means of Financing First-Party No-Fault Insurance, 58 Wash. U.L.Q. 59,
60-61 (1980).
31. J. O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 135-36. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1977, at 35, col.
mittedly well paid-personal injury lawyers are not tied to their time
sheets. There is, after all, a limit to how much an attorney can
charge anybody per hour. But if a lawyer gets one-third of a three
million dollar claim, and has several substantial personal injury cases
in his pipeline, he has "a piece of the action" in a way that other
lawyers do not. This explains why the personal injury bar is so
wealthy, and why it has so much invested in the present system, and
why it fights so ferociously to retain the system. That in turn is why
it is so difficult to pass a statute which will change that system.
There has been no new no-fault law passed in the United States,
except in the District of Columbia, since 1975." This is not because
no-fault insurance does not work well; the Michigan figures speak
for themselves. But the merits of any case are only part of the case
made in a legislature. Trial lawyers are, almost by definition, politi-
cal. They understand the political process. They make handsome
contributions to legislators at both the state and federal level, 3 and,
the argument they make is not, on its face, nonsense. The way the
tort system works, is in fact nonsense-but its underlying theory is
not. Lawyers can argue, for example, that it is immoral to treat the
drunk the same as the sober, or to treat the careful and the careless
equally. (That all payments are made out of large and impersonal
pools of insurance dollars, and that other forms of insur-
ance-whether life, health, or accident-do treat the drunk, the so-
ber, the careful, and the careless the same would seem to undercut
this argument.) The political power of lawyers and the complexity of
the arguments for reform, coupled with the difficulty of getting any
statute passed in this country-especially a controversial
one-makes legislative reform uncertain at best. Perhaps in time it
will be achieved, but anyone undertaking the quest must be ready
for frustration.
For example, any legislator who is interested in good causes can
be assured that there will be 500 other similarly good causes after
him to devote his time and energy to their particular issue-whether
it is child abuse, or the impoverished state of the arts. Even if one
can get the attention of an enlightened legislator, one cannot be at
all sure that what the legislature will pass will make any sense.
What may emerge, after all the pulling and hauling of various inter-
ests, may look like the proverbial camel designed by a committee
with humps and dips one never predicted. If you want to have your
heart in your mouth, go and watch a bill you are interested in being
debated in legislature. Watch the horse-trading that goes on; a
3.
32. D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2101-2113 (Supp. 1985). But that law was repealed in
November 1985. Wash. Post, Nov. 20, 1985, at 1, col.4.
33. J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 4, at 158-59.
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clause-which is absolutely essential to the bill-may be cut, with
the bill then sailing through in a form that is inimical to the purpose
in trying to get it passed in the first place. And, once a bill has been
passed, getting it amended is all that much more difficult. You have
had your turn; now the legislature will turn to the cause of another.
Alternatives in Contract
All this has led me to resort to alternatives to legislation. Not that
legislation should not be pressed for-but one should have alternate
means of addressing the problem. As a result, I have drafted a con-
tract for the National Federation of State High School Associations.
The Federation came to me after a case in the state of Washington,
in early 1980, when a young student athlete won a $6.3 million ver-
dict against the Seattle School District. The student had been ren-
dered a quadraplegic in a 1975 football game. In 1982-some seven
years later (with the law working with its customary "all deliberate
lassitude")-the student finally got in front of a jury and won that
massive verdict. 4 In the game, he had apparently used his helmet as
a spear and the resulting trauma had crippled him. His allegation
was that the coaches had not sufficiently instructed him to not lower
his head when he was about to make bodily contact. You can imag-
ine the quagmire of litigation, with the coaches trying to reconstruct
their 1975 training routine in 1982, and with endless dispute as to
what had happened years before.3 5 The student did seem to
win-although perhaps not. Seven years is not enough time for the
law. The case, of course, was appealed. 6 As a result, after another
year and a half the case was finally settled for some $3.7 million. All
the while, of course, a meter was ticking on both sides for lawyer
fees and other expenses. This youngster-a quadraplegic-waited
the better part of ten years for the glorious common law lottery to
come up with a prize.
At any rate, the case created a furor. Schools began to panic. How
could they insure against such fortuity? So desperate were they that
34. O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guaran-
tees of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898 (1985); Seattle Times,
July 22, 1983, at DI, cols. 1-5.
35. For a graphic description of the frustrations of such litigation, see O'Connell,
supra note 34, at 904, quoting from the Wash. Post, Apr. 23, 1983 at Al, col. 1, AS, col.
3.
36. This raises a discussion of the function of a defense lawyer in such a case. He
has two jobs. The first is to win the case; the second is to make sure that even if he loses
the case, there is error in the record, so that the loss will be appealable.
they even turned to me in light of the writing I have been doing
through the years about changes in the tort system. As a result I
drafted a contract37 with the following provisions: an insurer guaran-
tees to a school district that when an athlete is catastrophically in-
jured-defined as injury leading to more than $10,000 of loss-the
insurer will tender within ninety days to the student and his family
an offer to pay for all the net economic loss of the student, for medi-
cal expenses, rehabilitation, and even $300 a week for wage loss,
paid periodically as loss accrues, without regard to whether tort lia-
bility existed on the part of the school in the accident. Nothing is
payable for pain and suffering, nor does payment duplicate amounts
already paid to the student from a collateral source such as health
insurance. The student and his family are then given a further ninety
days to accept these benefits and waive their right to sue in tort--or
alternatively, to sue. As a result, the student has the alternative of
prompt payment of real losses rather than years of uncertainty. Im-
portantly, the rights of no one have been taken away. Nor has any-
body been forced to sign away rights when registering to play athlet-
ics. The student is a third-party beneficiary to the insurance
contract. In fact, he does not have to know anything about it, unless
and until he gets hurt.
When insurers first looked at my contract, they were worried that
athletes with good claims would proceed in tort and those with bad
tort claims would accept the no-fault benefits, with the result being
what insurers call adverse selection, and costs going through the ceil-
ing. My premise, however, is that seriously injured people are risk
averse 38 such that if an insurer came to such victims promptly after
the accident and made such an offer-in a manner which is not a
signal of weakness as to its case-it would be accepted. This latter
action is a very important point. Note that under this contract,
plaintiffs and their lawyers cannot perceive the tender of net eco-
nomic loss as a signal of weakness. The insurer makes the tender,
not because the lawyer for plaintiff has such a great reputation and
not because it fears liability. Rather, it makes the tender because it
contracted to do so before it could know anything about the acci-
dent. Thus, no suggestion of liability exists from the offer itself and
the threat to take the offer off the table in ninety days is a very
critical one. Indeed, the lawyer who advises that the tender be re-
jected may be looking at a malpractice suit himself. At a minimum,
he had better get "informed consent" from his client to reject the
tender.
37. For further description of the contract, see O'Connell, supra note 34, at 906-
15.
38. See supra text accompanying note 30.
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So far, the plan is in effect in forty-eight states and in the twenty
or so cases where it has been applied, all the accident victims have
agreed to accept the tender of benefits and waive their rights to sue
in tort.3 9
Could this plan be adapted to fit medical malpractice? It would be
more difficult in this area because, as we have seen, adverse results
can stem from health care or from the complaint which sent the
patient to a health care provider. The problem of distinguishing be-
tween the two is obviously difficult. This is not to say, however, that
there are no adverse results from health care that cannot be identi-
fied and be incorporated into a similar contract. °
I mention all of this because the tort system is such a nightmare
for so many people, despite its logical and intuitively sensible prem-
ises, that we should find ways around it. I would like to do so by
legislative rules. That would be simpler. This approach, however, is
so uncertain that we must also proceed by contract. Paul Samuelson,
the economist, once said that "some things society does so badly,
everybody benefits by change." That sentiment is true of the tort
system. Everybody will benefit by change--except the personal in-
jury bar. As a matter of fact, we do not have to worry about the
lawyers. They will continue to do very well in our society, no matter
what type of tort system we have. In a highly contentious, sophisti-
cated, arrogant society like ours, lawyers will be the last people on
the breadlines. But they will be disadvantaged by the kinds of
changes suggested and they will fight them. In this regard, however,
the real beauty of the contract approach appears. One does not have
to go to Richmond or Olympia or Sacramento to get legislative ap-
proval for contractual reform. Lawyers cannot block such change
unless they claim the contract is illegal, and they cannot accomplish
this because the contract has not removed anyone's rights; it has
merely offered an alternative to the cumbersome procedure of the
common law.
DETERRENCE?
Does no-fault deter accidents? It is very difficult to determine the
degree to which it acts as a deterrent. Workers' compensation did
away with tort law. Nonetheless, it internalizes the costs of accidents
by forcing the employer to automatically pay for medical expense
39. Personal communication to the author by the insurance brokerage firm
involved.
40. O'Connell, supra note 34, at 908-09.
and some wage loss in every case. It internalizes about as much as
the tort system did, albeit in different ways, with less transaction
costs, less money for pain and suffering, but with more being paid
for medical expense and wage loss.
A study done by economist Elisabeth Landes purports to prove
that no-fault auto insurance causes an increase in the death rate.4'
The study encounters a real problem, because no-fault in every in-
stance preserves the tort action in death cases. The author maintains
that motorists learn, or at least act as though they have learned, the
difference between a threshold which allows you to sue in tort if
more than $500 in medical expenses is incurred versus a threshold of
more than $750, or one of more than $1000. She purports to find
that the higher the threshold of the state law which immunizes the
tortfeasor from suit in tort, the more death cases arise in that state.
In other words, the more a state abolishes tort suits, the more acci-
dents there are. The flaw in the study is that she assumes superra-
tional people who understand the distinction between a threshold of
$500 and a threshold of $750 or $1000, and then act on that knowl-
edge. At the same time, these superrational people get fooled into
causing deaths for which they are still liable. Now, she cannot have
it both ways. She cannot assume superrational people who under-
stand these fine shadings of distinction in liability and cause more
accidents if you immunize them at $750 versus $500, and then as-
sume that those same people somehow get confused about cases in-
volving death and go out and cause deaths. If they are superrational,
they are superrational. There has to be some other explanation than
their understanding of the tort system that explains her figures.4 2 In-
deed, another study challenges her finding that there are such varia-
tions in death rates.43
Even so, the question of the deterrent effect of tort law is certainly
worth asking. When you immunize people from tort liability, or
when you pay them regardless of their fault, will you increase their
proclivity to get into accidents? My instinct is that this question is
not something we need worry about, especially if you still internalize
accident costs significantly as the American law of workers' compen-
41. Landes, Insurance Liability and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical In-
vestigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J. L. & EcoN. 49 (1982).
42. O'Connell & Levmore, Reply to Landes: A Faulty Study of No-Fault's Effect
of Fault?, 48 Mo. L. REv. 649 (1983).
43. Zador & Lund, No-Fault Auto Insurance and Fatal Crashes: Re-examination
of Landes' Empirical Investigation, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (1983). For
an even more recent study disclaiming any connection between the enactment of no-fault
and the dramatic escalation of fatal accidents, see Kochanowski & Young, Deterrent
Aspects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance: Some Empirical Findings, 52 J. RISK AND
INS. 269 (1985). As pointed out above, it is doubtful whether one can use statistics con-
cerning fatalities to appraise no-fault statutes. O'Connell & Levmore, supra note 42.
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sation and no-fault auto insurance does. The presence of deterrence
remains, and those who insist that deterrence will lessen without tort
liability must be challenged to prove their case.
New Zealand has gone much further than anything just proposed,
and New Zealand is, after all, a common law country. That country
has abolished all tort law for personal injury; no one ever gets sued
in New Zealand today for personal injury unless he or she intention-
ally injures someone. How is one paid? By being provided with
workers' compensation-like benefits from a government insurance of-
fice, regardless of how the injury occurred. 4 There is, thus, no inter-
nalization of costs in New Zealand against product manufacturers or
medical health care providers and yet, New Zealanders do not seem
to find any change in their accident rates. Admittedly, the issue has
not been studied very extensively; they tend to dismiss all of this talk
of economic internalization by tort litigation as a lot of American
nonsense.4 5 The deterrence point, however, is worth thinking about.
The workers' compensation experience, the no-fault auto experi-
ence, and generally the availability of tort liability insurance has
been such that it is hard to ascertain if paying insurance dollars for
serious personal injury encourages an increase in the accident fre-
quency. It is hard to prove that a no-fault proposal is not worth the
advantages it achieves in lowering transaction costs, by not paying
lawyers, and in redistributing income. This is my policy hunch. We
do not really know, however, because the data is not available. It is
worth discussing, but I would close the way I opened. Almost any-
thing is likely to be better than the common-law tort system that
lawyers have devised.
44. Accident Compensation Act, 1972, No. 43, 1 N.Z. Stat. 521. Harris, Accident
Compensation in New Zealand: A Comprehensive Insurance System, 37 MOD. L. REV.
361 (1974).
45. Cf. Palmer, Compensation for Personal Injury: A Requiem for the Common
Law in New Zealand, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 23-31 (1973). But for a study indicating no
adverse effect on deterrence of auto accidents as a result of the New Zealand scheme, see
Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experience, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 976 (1985).

